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Abstract. Social media is becoming increasingly popular for news con-
sumption due to its easy access, fast dissemination, and low cost. However,
social media also enables the wide propagation of “fake news”, i.e., news
with intentionally false information. Fake news on social media can have
significant negative societal effects. Identifying and mitigating fake news
also presents unique challenges. To tackle these challenges, many existing
research efforts exploit various features of the data, including network
features. In essence, a news dissemination ecosystem involves three dimen-
sions on social media, i.e., a content dimension, a social dimension, and a
temporal dimension. In this chapter, we will review network properties
for studying fake news, introduce popular network types and propose how
these networks can be used to detect and mitigate fake news on social
media.
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1 Introduction
Social media has become an important means of large-scale information sharing
and communication in all occupations, including marketing, journalism, public
relations, and more [35]. The reasons for this change in consumption behaviors are
clear: (i) it is often faster and cheaper to consume news on social media compared
to news on traditional media, such as newspapers or television; and (ii) it is easier
to share, comment on, and discuss the news with friends or other readers on social
media. However, the low cost, easy access, and rapid dissemination of information
of social media draws a large audience and enables the wide propagation of “fake
news”, i.e., news with intentionally false information. Fake news on social media
is growing fast in volume and can have negative societal impacts. First, people
may accept deliberate lies as truths [17]; second, fake news can change the way
people respond to legitimate news; and finally, the prevalence of fake news has
the potential to break the trustworthiness of the entire news ecosystem. In this
chapter, we discuss recent advancements–based on a network perspective–for the
detection and mitigation of fake news.
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Fake news on social media presents unique challenges. First, fake news is
intentionally written to mislead readers, which makes it nontrivial to detect
simply based on content. Second, social media data is large-scale, multi-modal,
mostly user-generated, sometimes anonymous and noisy. Third, the consumers
of social media come from different backgrounds, have disparate preferences or
needs, and use social media for varied purposes. Finally, the low cost of creating
social media accounts makes it easy to create malicious accounts, such as social
bots, cyborg users and trolls, all of which can become powerful sources and
proliferation of fake news.
The news dissemination ecosystem on social media involves three dimensions
(Figure 1), a content dimension (“What”), a social dimension (“Who”), and a
temporal dimension (“When”). The content dimension describes the correlation
among news pieces, social media posts, comments, etc. The social dimension
involves the relations among publishers, news spreaders and consumers. The
temporal dimension illustrates the evolution of users’ publishing and posting
behaviors over time. As we will show, we can use these relations to detect and
mitigate the effects of fake news.
Fig. 1. The Information Dimensions of News Dissemination Ecosystem.
Detection of fake news can be formalized as a classification task that requires
feature extraction and model construction. Recent advancements of network
representation learning, such as network embedding and deep neural networks,
allow us to better capture the features of news from auxiliary information such
as friendship network, temporal user engagements, and interaction networks. In
addition, knowledge networks as auxiliary information can help evaluate the
veracity of news through network matching operations such as path finding and
flow optimization. For mitigation, the aim is to proactively block target users or
start a mitigating campaign at an early stage. We will show that network diffusion
models can be applied to trace the provenance nodes and provenance paths of
fake news. In addition, the impact of fake news can be assessed and mitigated
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through network estimation and network influence minimization strategies. We
begin, then, with an introduction to network properties.
2 Network Properties
In this section, we outline the potential role of network properties for the study
of fake news. First, users form groups with like-minded people, resulting in
what are widely known as echo chambers. Second, individual users play different
roles in the dissemination of fake news. Third, social media platforms allow
users to personalize how information is presented to them, thus isolating users
from information outside their personalized filter bubbles. Finally, highly active
malicious user accounts become powerful sources and proliferators of fake news.
2.1 Echo Chambers
The process of seeking and consuming information on social media is becoming
less mediated. Users on social media tend to follow like-minded people and
thus receive news that promotes their preferred, existing narratives. This may
increase social polarization, resulting in an echo chamber effect [2]. The echo
chamber effect facilitates the process by which people consume and believe fake
news based on the following psychological factors [17]: i) social credibility, which
means people are more likely to perceive a source as credible if others perceive
it as such, especially when there is not enough information available to assess
the truthfulness of that source; and ii) frequency heuristic, which means that
consumers may naturally favor information they hear frequently, even if it is fake
news. In echo chambers, users share and consume the same information, which
creates segmented and polarized communities.
2.2 Individual Users
During the fake news dissemination process, individual users play different
roles. For example, i) persuaders spread fake news with supporting opinions to
persuade and influence others to believe it; ii) gullible users are credulous and
easily persuaded to believe fake news; and iii) clarifiers propose skeptical and
opposing viewpoints to clarify fake news. Social identity theory [30] suggests
that social acceptance and affirmation is essential to a person’s identity and self-
esteem, making persuaders likely to choose “socially safe” options when consuming
and disseminating news information. They follow the norms established in the
community even if the news being shared is fake news. The cascade of fake news
is driven not only by influential persuaders but also by a critical mass of easily
influenced individuals [7], i.e., gullible users. Gullibility is a different concept
from trust. In psychological theory [20], general trust is defined as the default
expectations of other people’s trustworthiness. High trusters are individuals who
assume that people are trustworthy unless proven otherwise. Gullibility, on the
other hand, is insensitivity to information revealing untrustworthiness. Reducing
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the diffusion of fake news to gullible users is critical to mitigating fake news.
Clarifiers can spread opposing opinions against fake news and avoid one-sided
viewpoints. Clarifiers can also spread true news which can: i) immunize users
against changing beliefs before they are affected by fake news; and ii) further
propagate and spread true news to other users.
2.3 Filter Bubbles
A filter bubble is an intellectual isolation that occurs when social media websites
use algorithms to personalize the information a user would want to see [16].
The algorithms make assumptions about user preferences based on the user’s
historical data, such as former click behavior, browsing history, search history,
and location. Given these assumptions, the website is more likely to present
information that will support the user’s past online activities. A filter bubble can
reduce connections with contradicting viewpoints, causing the user to become
intellectually isolated. A filter bubble will amplify the individual psychological
challenges to dispelling fake news. These challenges include: i) Naïve Realism [33]:
consumers tend to believe that their perceptions of reality are the only accurate
views, while others who disagree are regarded as uninformed, irrational, or biased;
and ii) Confirmation Bias [15]: consumers prefer to receive information that
confirms their existing views.
2.4 Malicious Accounts
Social media users can be malicious, and some malicious users may not even be
real humans. Malicious accounts that can amplify the spread of fake news include
social bots, trolls, and cyborg users. Social bots are social media accounts that
are controlled by a computer algorithm. The algorithm automatically produces
content and interacts with humans (or other bot users) on social media. Social
bots can be malicious entities designed specifically for manipulating and spreading
fake news on social media. Trolls are real human users who aim to disrupt online
communities and provoke consumers to an emotional response. Trolls enable the
easy dissemination of fake news among otherwise normal online communities.
Finally, cyborg users can spread fake news in a way that blends automated
activities with human input. Cyborg accounts are usually registered by a human
as a disguise for automated programs that are set to perform activities on social
media. The easy switch between humans and bots offer cyborg users unique
opportunities to spread fake news.
3 Network Types
In this section, we introduce several network structures that are commonly used
to detect and mitigate fake news. Then, following the three dimensions of the
news dissemination ecosystem outlined above, we illustrate how homogeneous
and heterogeneous networks can be built within a specific dimension and across
dimensions.
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3.1 Homogeneous Networks
(a) Friendship Network (b) Diffusion Network (c) Credibility Network
Fig. 2. Homogeneous Networks. Three types of homogeneous networks are illustrated:
friendship network, diffusion network, and credibility network. Node 𝑢 indicates a user,
and 𝑠 represents a social media post.
Homogeneous networks have the same node and link types. As shown in
Figure 2, we introduce three types of homogeneous networks: friendship networks,
diffusion networks, and credibility networks. Each of these types is potentially
useful in detecting and mitigating fake news.
Friendship Networks A user’s friendship network in the social layer can be
represented as a directed graph 𝐺𝐹 = (𝑈,𝐸𝐹 ), where 𝑈 and 𝐸𝐹 are the node
and edge sets, respectively. A node 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 represents a user, and (𝑢1, 𝑢2) ∈ 𝐸
represents whether a social relation exists.
Homophily theory [13] suggests that users tend to form relationships with
like-minded friends, rather than with users who have opposing preferences and
interests. Likewise, social influence theory [12] predicts that users are more likely
to share similar latent interests towards news pieces. Thus, the friendship network
provides the structure to understand the set of social relationships among users.
The friendship network is the basic route for news spreading and can reveal
community information.
Diffusion Networks A diffusion network in the social layer can be represented
as a directed graph 𝐺𝐷 = (𝑈,𝐸𝐷, 𝑝, 𝑡), where 𝑈 and 𝐸 are the node and edge
sets, respectively. A node 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 represents an entity, which can publish, receive,
and propagate information at time 𝑡𝑖 ∈ 𝑡. A directed edge, (𝑢1 → 𝑢2) ∈ 𝐸𝐷,
between nodes 𝑢1, 𝑢2 ∈ 𝑈 represents the direction of information propagation.
Each directed edge (𝑢1 → 𝑢2) ∈ 𝐸𝐷, between nodes 𝑢1, 𝑢2 ∈ 𝑈 represents the
direction of information propagation. Each directed edge (𝑢1 → 𝑢2) is assumed to
be associated with an information propagation probability, 𝑝(𝑢1 → 𝑢2) ∈ [0, 1].
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The diffusion network is important for learning about representations of the
structure and temporal patterns to help identify fake news. By discovering the
sources of fake news and the spreading paths among the users, we can also better
mitigate fake news problem.
Credibility Networks A credibility network [9] can be represented as an
undirected graph 𝐺𝐶 = (𝑉,𝐸𝐶 , 𝑠), where 𝑉 denotes the set of social media posts
with corresponding credibility scores that are related to original news pieces, and
the edges 𝐸 denote the link type, such as supporting and opposing, between two
nodes. and 𝑐(𝑣1, 𝑣2) indicates the conflicting degree of credibility values of node
𝑣1 and 𝑣2.
Users express their viewpoints toward original news pieces through social
media posts. In these posts, they can either express the same viewpoints (which
mutually support each other), or conflicting viewpoints (which may reduce their
credibility scores). By modeling these relationships, the credibility network can
be used to evaluate the overall truthfulness of news by leveraging the credibility
scores of each social media post relevant to the news.
3.2 Heterogeneous Networks
(a) Knowledge Network (b) Stance Network (c) Interaction Network
Fig.3. Heterogeneous Networks. Three types of homogeneous networks are illustrated:
knowledge network, stance network, and interaction network. Node 𝑜 indicates a knowl-
edge entity, 𝑣 represents a news item, and 𝑝 means a news publisher.
Heterogeneous networks have a different set of node and link types. The
advantages of heterogeneous networks are the abilities to represent and encode
information and relationships from different perspectives. During the news dis-
semination process, different types of entities are involved, including users, the
social media posts, the actual news, etc. Figure 3 shows the common types of
heterogeneous networks for analyzing fake news: knowledge networks, stance
networks, and interaction networks.
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Knowledge Networks A knowledge network (i.e., knowledge graph) 𝐺𝐾 =
(𝐼, 𝐸𝐼 , 𝑅) is constructed with the nodes 𝐼 representing the knowledge entities,
edges 𝐸𝐼 indicating the relation between them, 𝑅 is the relation sets, and
𝑔 : 𝐸 → 𝑅 is the function labeling each edge with a semantic predicate.
The knowledge network integrates linked open data, such as DBdata and
Google Relation Extraction Corpus (GREC), as a heterogeneous network topol-
ogy. Fact-checking using a knowledge graph checks whether the claims in news
content can be inferred from existing facts in the knowledge networks [6,23].
Stance Networks A heterogeneous stance network can be represented as a
heterogeneous network 𝐺𝑆 = ({𝑈, 𝑆, 𝑉 }, 𝐸𝑆), where the nodes can be users, news
items and social media posts; and the edges 𝐸𝑆 denote the link type between two
nodes, such as posting between users and posts, and stance between posts and
news items. The stances are treated as important signals and can be aggregated
to infer the news veracity.
Stances (or viewpoints) indicate the users’ opinions towards the news, such
as supporting, opposing, etc. Typically, fake news pieces will provoke tremendous
controversial views among social media users, in which denying and questioning
stances are found to play a crucial role in signaling claims as being fake.
Interaction Networks An interaction network 𝐺𝐼 = ({𝑃,𝑈, 𝑉 }, 𝐸𝐼) consists
of nodes representing publishers, users, news, and the edges 𝐸𝐼 indicating the
interactions among them. For example, edge (𝑝→ 𝑣) demonstrates that publisher
𝑝 publishes news item 𝑣, and (𝑣 → 𝑢) represents news 𝑣 is spread by user 𝑢.
The interaction networks can represent the correlations among different types
of entities, such as publisher, news, and social media post, during the news
dissemination process [26]. The characteristics of publishers and users, and the
publisher-news and news-users interactions have potential to differentiate fake
news.
4 Fake News Detection
Fake news detection evaluates the truth value of a news piece, which can be
formalized as a classification problem. The common procedure is feature extraction
and model construction. In feature extraction, we capture the differentiable
characteristics of news pieces to construct effective representations; Based on
these representations, we can construct various models to learn and transform
the features into a predicted label. To this end, we introduce how features and
models can be extracted and constructed in different types of networks.
4.1 Interaction Network Embedding
Interaction networks describe the relationships among different entities such as
publishers, news pieces, and users. Given the interaction networks the goal is to
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embed the different types of entities into the same latent space, by modeling the
interactions among them. We can leverage the resultant feature representations
of news to perform fake news detection.
News Embedding We can use news content to find clues to differentiate
fake news and true news. Using non-negative Matrix Factorization (NMF) we
can attempt to project the document-word matrix to a joint latent semantic
factor space with low dimensionality, such that the document-word relations are
modeled as the inner product in the space. Specifically, giving the news-word
matrix X ∈ R𝑛×𝑡+ , NMF methods try to find two nonnegative matrices D ∈ R𝑛×𝑑+
and V ∈ R𝑡×𝑑+ by solving the following optimization problem,
min
D,V≥0
‖ X−DV𝑇 ‖2𝐹 (1)
where 𝑑 is the dimension of the latent topic space. In addition, D and V are
the nonnegative matrices indicating low-dimensional representations of news and
words.
User Embedding. On social media, people tend to form relationships with
like-minded friends, rather than with users who have opposing preferences and
interests [27]. Thus, connected users are more likely to share similar latent interests
in news pieces. To obtain a standardized representation, we use nonnegative
matrix factorization to learn the user’s latent representations (we will introduce
other methods in Section 4.3). Specifically, giving user-user adjacency matrix
A ∈ {0, 1}𝑚×𝑚, we learn nonnegative matrix U ∈ R𝑚×𝑑+ by solving the following
optimization problem,
min
U,T≥0
‖Y⊙ (A−UTU𝑇 )‖2𝐹 (2)
where U is the user latent matrix, T ∈ R𝑑×𝑑+ is the user-user correlation matrix,
and Y ∈ R𝑚×𝑚 controls the contribution of A. Since only positive samples are
given in A, we can first set Y = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(A), then perform negative sampling and
generate the same number of unobserved links and set weights as 0.
User-News Embedding The user-news interactions can be modeled by
considering the relationships between user attributes and the level of veracity
of news items. Intuitively, users with low credibilities are more likely to spread
fake news, while users with high credibility scores are less likely to spread fake
news. Each user has a credibility score that we can infer using his/her published
posts [1], and we use c = {c1, c2, ..., c𝑚} to denote the credibility score vector,
where a larger 𝑐𝑖 ∈ [0, 1] indicates that user 𝑢𝑖 has a higher credibility. The
user-news engaging matrix is represented as W ∈ {0, 1}𝑚×𝑛, where W𝑖𝑗 = 1
indicates that user 𝑢𝑖 has engaged in the spreading process of the news piece 𝑣𝑗
; otherwise W𝑖𝑗 = 0. The user-news embedding objective function is shown as
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follows,
min
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
W𝑖𝑗c𝑖(1− 1 + y𝐿𝑗2 )||U𝑖 −D𝑗 ||
2
2⏟  ⏞  
True news
+
𝑚∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑟∑︁
𝑗=1
W𝑖𝑗(1− c𝑖)(1 + y𝐿𝑗2 )||U𝑖 −D𝑗 ||
2
2⏟  ⏞  
Fake news
(3)
where y𝐿 ∈ R𝑟×1 is the label vector of all partially labeled news. The objective
considers two situations: i) for true news, i.e., y𝐿𝑗 = −1, which ensures that the
distance between latent features of high-credibility users and that of true news
is small; and ii) for fake news, i.e., y𝐿𝑗 = 1, which ensures that the distance
between the latent features of low-credibility users and that of true news is small.
Publisher-News Embedding The publisher-news interactions can be mod-
eled by incorporating the characteristics of the publisher and news veracity values.
Fake news is often written to convey opinions or claims that support the partisan
bias of the news publisher. Publishers with a high degree of political bias are
more likely to publish fake news [26]. Thus, a useful news representation should
be good at predicting the partisan bias score of its publisher. The partisan bias
scores are collected from fact-checking websites and can be represented as a vector
o. We can utilize publisher partisan labels vector o ∈ R𝑙×1 and publisher-news
matrix B ∈ R𝑙×𝑛 to optimize the news feature representation learning as follows,
min ‖ B¯DQ− o‖22 (4)
where the latent feature of news publisher can be represented by the features
of all the news it published, i.e., B¯D. B¯ is the normalized user-news publishing
relation matrix, i.e., B¯𝑘𝑗 = B𝑘𝑗∑︀𝑛
𝑗=1
B𝑘𝑗
. Q ∈ R𝑑×1 is the weighting matrix that
maps news publishers’ latent features to corresponding partisan label vector o.
The finalized model combines all previous components into a coherent model.
In this way, we can obtain the latent representations of news items D and of
users U through the network embedding procedure, which can be utilized to
perform fake news classification tasks.
4.2 Temporal Diffusion Representation
The news diffusion process involves abundant temporal user engagements on
social media [21,25,34]. The social news engagements can be defined as a set of
tuples 𝐸 = 𝑒𝑖 to represent the process of how news items spread over time among
𝑚 users in 𝑈 = {𝑢1, 𝑢2, ..., 𝑢𝑚}. Each engagement 𝑒𝑖 = {𝑢𝑖, 𝑡𝑖, 𝑠𝑖} represents that
a user 𝑢𝑖 spreads news article at time 𝑡𝑖 by posting 𝑠𝑖. As shown in Figure 4,
the information diffusion network consists of two major parts of knowledge: i)
temporal user engagements and ii) a friendship network. For example, a diffusion
path between two users 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑗 exists if and only if (1) 𝑢𝑗 follows 𝑢𝑖; and (2)
𝑢𝑗 posts about a given news only after 𝑢𝑖 does so.
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Fig. 4. A diffusion network consists of temporal user engagements and a friendship
network.
The goal of learning temporal representations is to capture the user’s pattern
of temporal engagements with a news article 𝑣𝑗 . Recent advances in the study of
deep neural networks, such as Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), have shown
promising performance for learning representations. RNN are powerful structures
that allow the use of loops within the neural network to model sequential data.
Given the diffusion network 𝐺𝐷, the key procedure is to construct meaningful
features x𝑖 for each engagement 𝑒𝑖. The features can generally be extracted
from the contents of 𝑠𝑖 and the attributes of 𝑢𝑖. For example, x𝑖 consists of
the following components: x𝑖 = (𝜂,𝛥𝑡,x𝑢𝑖 , 𝑥𝑠𝑖). The first two variables 𝜂 and
𝛥𝑡, represent the number of total user engagements through time 𝑡 and the
time difference between engagements, respectively. These variables capture the
general measure of frequency and time interval distribution of user engagements
of the news piece 𝑣𝑗 . For the content features of users posts, the x𝑠𝑖 can be
extracted from hand-crafted linguistic features, such as n-gram features, or by
using word embedding methods such as doc2vec [11] or GloVe [18]. We can extract
the features of users x𝑢𝑖 by performing a singular value decomposition of the
user-news interaction matrix W ∈ {0, 1}𝑚×𝑛, where W𝑖𝑗 = 1 indicate that user
𝑢𝑖 has engaged in the process of spreading the news piece 𝑣𝑗 ; otherwise W𝑖𝑗 = 0.
The RNN framework for learning news temporal representations is demon-
strated in Figure 5. Since x𝑖 includes features that come from different information
space, such as temporal and content features, so we do not suggest incorporating
x𝑖 into RNN as the raw input. Thus, we can add a fully connected embedding
layer to convert the raw input x𝑖 into a standardized input features x˜𝑖, in which
the parameters are shared among all raw input features x𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, ...,𝑚. Thus, the
RNN takes a sequence x˜1, x˜2, ..., x˜𝑚 as input. At each time-step 𝑖, the output of
previous step h𝑖−1, and the next feature input x˜𝑖 are used to update the hidden
state h𝑖. The hidden states h𝑖 is the feature representation of the sequence up to
time 𝑖 for the input engagement sequence. Thus, the hidden states of final step
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h𝑚 is passed through a fully connected layer to learn the resultant news repre-
sentation, defined as v𝑗 = tanh(W𝑟h𝑚 + b𝑟), where W𝑟 is the weight matrix
and b𝑟 is a bias vector. Thus, we can use v𝑗 to perform fake news detection and
related tasks [21].
Fig. 5. RNN framework for learning news temporal representations.
4.3 Friendship Network Embedding
News temporal representations can capture the evolving patterns of news spread-
ing sequences. However, we lose the direct dependencies of users, which plays
an important role in fake news diffusion. The fact that users are likely to form
echo chambers, strengthens our need to model user social representations and to
explore its added value for a fake news study. Essentially, given the friendship
network 𝐺𝐹 , we want to learn latent representations of users while preserving
the structural properties of the network, including first-order and higher-order
structure, such as second-order structure and community structure. For example,
Deepwalk [19] can preserve the neighborhood structure of nodes by modeling a
stream of random walks. In addition, LINE [31] can preserve both first-order and
second-order proximities. Specifically, we can measure the first-order proximity
by the joint probability distribution between the user 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑢𝑗 ,
𝑝1(𝑢𝑖, 𝑢𝑗) =
1
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−ui𝑇u𝑗) (5)
where 𝑢𝑖 (𝑢𝑗) is the social representation of user 𝑢𝑖 (𝑢𝑗). We can model the
second-order proximity by the probability of the context user 𝑢𝑗 being generated
by the user 𝑢𝑖, as follows,
𝑝2(𝑢𝑗 |𝑢𝑖) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(uj
𝑇u𝑖)∑︀|𝑉 |
𝑘=1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(uk𝑇u𝑖)
(6)
where |𝑉 | is the number of nodes or “contexts” for user 𝑢𝑖. This conditional
distribution implies that users with similar distributions over the contexts are
similar to each other. The learning objective is to minimize the KL-divergence of
the two distributions and empirical distributions respectively.
12 Kai Shu, H. Russell Bernard and Huan Liu
Network communities may actually be the more important structural di-
mension because fake news spreaders are likely to form polarized groups [25].
This requires the representation learning methods to be able to model com-
munity structures. For example, a community-preserving node representation
learning method, Modularized Nonnegative Matrix Factorization (MNMF), is
proposed [32]. The overall objective is defined as follows,
min
M,U,H,C≥0
‖ S−MU𝑇 ‖2𝐹⏟  ⏞  
Proximity Mapping
+ 𝛼‖H−UC𝑇 ‖2𝐹⏟  ⏞  
Community Mapping
− 𝛽𝑡𝑟(H𝑇BH)⏟  ⏞  
Modularity Modeling
𝑠.𝑡. 𝑡𝑟(H𝑇H) = 𝑚
(7)
and comprises three major parts: proximity mapping, community mapping, and
modularity modeling. In proximity mapping, S ∈ R𝑚×𝑚 is the user similarity
matrix constructed from the user adjacency matrix (first-order proximity) and
neighborhood similarity matrix (second-order proximity), and M ∈ R𝑚×𝑘 and
U ∈ R𝑚×𝑘 are the basis matrix and user representations. For community mapping,
H ∈ R𝑚×𝑙 is the user-community indicator matrix that we optimize to be
reconstructed by the product of the user latent matrix U and the community
latent matrix C ∈ R𝑙×𝑚. For modularity modeling, it represents the objective to
maximize the modularity function [14], and B ∈ R𝑚×𝑚 is the modularity matrix.
Credibility Network Propagation The basic assumption is that the credi-
bility of a given news event is highly related to the credibilities of its relevant
social media posts [9]. To classify whether a news item is true of fake, we can
collect all relevant social media posts. Then, we can evaluate the news veracity
score by averaging the credibility scores of all the posts.
Given the credibility network 𝐺𝐶 for specific news pieces, the goal is to
optimize the credibility values of each node (i.e., social media post), and infer the
credibility value of corresponding news items [9]. In the credibility network 𝐺𝐶 ,
there are i) a post credibility vector T = {𝐶(𝑠1), 𝐶(𝑠2), ..., 𝐶(𝑠𝑛)} with 𝐶(𝑠𝑖)
denoting the credibility value of post 𝑠𝑖; and ii) a matrix W ∈ R𝑛×𝑛, where
W𝑖𝑗 = 𝑓(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) which denotes the viewpoint correlations between post 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 ,
that is, whether the two posts take supporting or opposing positions.
Network Initialization Network initialization consists of two parts: node
initialization and link initialization. First, we obtain the initial credibility score
vector of nodes T0 from pre-trained classifiers with features extracted from
external training data. The link is defined by mining the viewpoint relations,
which are the relations between each pair of viewpoint such as contradicting
or same. The basic idea is that posts with same viewpoints form supporting
relations which raise their credibilities, and posts with contradicting viewpoints
form opposing relations which weaken their credibilities. Specifically, a social
media post 𝑠𝑖 is modeled as a multinomial distribution 𝜃𝑖 over 𝐾 topics, and
a topic k is modeled as a multinomial distribution 𝜓𝑡𝑘 over 𝐿 viewpoints. The
probability of a post 𝑠𝑡 over topic 𝑘 along with 𝐿 viewpoints is denoted as
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𝑝𝑖𝑘 = 𝜃𝑖 × 𝜓𝑖𝑘. The distance between two posts 𝑠𝑡 and 𝑠𝑗 are measured by using
the Jensen-Shannon Distance: 𝐷𝑖𝑠(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) = 𝐷𝐽𝑆(𝑝𝑖𝑘||𝑝𝑗𝑘).
The supporting or opposing relation indicator is determined as follows: it’s
assumed that one post contains a major topic-viewpoint, which can be defined as
the largest proportion of 𝑝𝑖𝑘. If the major topic-viewpoints of two posts 𝑠𝑖 and
𝑠𝑗 are clustered together (they take the same viewpoint), then they are mutually
supporting; otherwise, they are mutually opposing. The similarity/dissimilarity
measure of two posts are defined as:
𝑓(𝑠𝑖, 𝑠𝑗) =
(−1)𝑎
𝐷𝐽𝑆(𝑝𝑖𝑘||𝑝𝑗𝑘) + 1 (8)
where 𝑎 is the link type indicator, and if 𝑎 = 0, then 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑠𝑗 take the same
viewpoint; otherwise, 𝑎 = 1.
Network Optimization Posts with supporting relations should have similar
credibility values; posts with opposing relations should have opposing credibility
values. Therefore, the objective can be defined as a network optimization problem
as below:
𝑄(T) =𝜇
𝑛∑︁
𝑖,𝑗=1
|Wij|
(︀𝐶(𝑠𝑖)√︀
D¯𝑖𝑖
− 𝑏𝑖𝑗 𝐶(𝑠𝑗)√︁
D¯𝑗𝑗
)︀2
+ (1− 𝜇)‖T−T0‖2
(9)
where D¯ is a diagonal matrix with D¯𝑖𝑖 =
∑︀
𝑘 |W𝑖𝑘| and 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 1, if W𝑖𝑗 ≥ 0;
otherwise 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 0. The first component is the smoothness constraint which
guarantees the two assumptions of supporting and opposing relations; the second
component is the fitting constraint to ensure variables not change too much
from their initial values; and 𝜇 is the regularization parameter to trade off two
constraints. Then the credibility propagation on the proposed network 𝐺𝐶 is
formulated as the minimization of this loss function:
T* = argmin
T
𝑄(T) (10)
The optimum solution can be solved by updatingT in an iterative manner through
the transition functionT(𝑡) = 𝜇HT(𝑡−1)+(1−𝜇T0), whereH = D¯−1/2WD¯−1/2.
As the iteration converges, each post receives a final credibility value, and the
average of them is served as the final credibility evaluation result for the news.
4.4 Knowledge Network Matching
In this section, we focus on exploiting knowledge networks to detect fake news.
Knowledge networks are used as an auxiliary source to fact-check news claims.
The goal is to match news claims with the facts in represented in knowledge
networks.
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Path Finding Fake news spreads false claims in news content, so a natural
means of detecting fake news is to check the truthfulness of major claims in
the news article. Fact-checking methods use external sources such as knowledge
networks, to assess the truthfulness of information. Specifically, a news claim can
be checked automatically by finding the matching path to knowledge networks.
A claim in news content can be represented by a subject-predicate-object triple
𝑐 = (𝑠, 𝑝, 𝑜), where the subject entity 𝑠 is related to the object entity 𝑜 by the
predicate relation 𝑝.
We can find all the paths that start with 𝑠 and end with 𝑜, and then evaluate
these paths to estimate the truth value of the claim. This set of paths, also named
knowledge stream [24], are denoted as 𝒫(𝑠, 𝑜). Intuitively, if the paths involve
more specific entities, then the claim is more likely to be true. Thus, we can
define a “specificity” measure 𝑆(𝑃𝑠,𝑜) as follows,
𝑆(𝑃𝑠,𝑜) =
1
1 +
∑︀𝑛−1
𝑖=2 log 𝑑(𝑜𝑖)
(11)
where 𝑑(𝑜𝑖) is the degree of entity 𝑜𝑖, i.e., the number of paths that entity 𝑜
participates. One approach is to optimize a path evaluation function: 𝜏(𝑐) =
max𝒲(𝑃𝑠,𝑜), which maps the set of possible paths connecting 𝑠 and 𝑜 (i.e.,
𝑃𝑠,𝑜)to a truth value 𝜏 . If 𝑠 is already present in the knowledge network, it can
assign maximum truth value 1; otherwise the objective function will be optimized
to find the shortest path between 𝑠 and 𝑜.
Flow Optimization We can assume that each edge of the network is associated
with two quantities: a capacity to carry knowledge related to (𝑠, 𝑝, 𝑜) across its
two endpoints, and a cost of usage. The capacity can be computed using 𝑆(𝑃𝑠,𝑜),
and the cost of an edge in knowledge is defined as 𝑐𝑒 = log 𝑑(𝑜𝑖). The goal is to
identify the set of paths responsible for the maximum flow of knowledge between
𝑠 and 𝑜 at the minimum cost. The maximum knowledge a path 𝑃𝑠,𝑜 can carry
is the minimum knowledge of its edges, also called its bottleneck 𝐵(𝑃𝑠,𝑜). Thus,
the objective can be defined as a minimum cost maximum flow problem,
𝜏(𝑒) =
∑︁
𝑃𝑠,𝑜∈𝒫𝑠,𝑜
𝐵(𝑃𝑠,𝑜) · 𝑆(𝑃𝑠,𝑜) (12)
where 𝐵(𝑃𝑠,𝑜) is denoted as a minimization form: 𝐵(𝑃𝑠,𝑜) = min{𝑥𝑒| ∈ 𝑃𝑠,𝑜},
with 𝑥𝑒 indicating the residual capacity of edge 𝑥 in a residual network [24].
Discussion The knowledge network itself can be incomplete and noisy. For
example, the entities in fake news claims may not correspond to any path exactly
or may match multiple entities in the knowledge network. In this case, only
performing path finding and flow optimization is not enough to obtain a good
result to assess the truth value. Therefore, additional tasks (e.g., entity resolution,
and link prediction) need to be considered in order to reconstruct the knowledge
network and to facilitate its capability. Entity resolution is the process of finding
related entities and creating links among them. Link prediction predicts the
unseen links and relations among the entities.
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Stance Network Aggregation We can present the stance of users’ posts
either explicitly or implicitly. Explicit stances are direct expressions of emotion or
opinion, such as Facebook’s “like” actions. Implicit stances can be automatically
extracted from social media posts.
Consider the scenario where the stances are explicitly expressed in “like”
actions on social media. Given the stance network 𝐺𝑆 = {𝑈 ∪𝑆∪𝑉,𝐸𝑆}, the first
step is to construct a bipartite graph (𝑈 ∪𝑉,𝐿), where 𝐿 is the set of likes actions.
The idea is that user express “like” actions due to both the user reputations
and news qualities. The users and news items can be characterized by the Beta
distributions Beta(𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖) and Beta(𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗), respectively. The distribution of a
user Beta(𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖) represents the reputation or reliability of user 𝑢𝑖, and the
distribution of a new piece Beta(𝛼𝑗 , 𝛽𝑗) represents the veracity of news 𝑣𝑗 . The
expectation values of the Beta distribution are used to estimate the degree of
user reputation (𝑝𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖𝛼𝑖+𝛽𝑖 ) or new veracity (𝑝𝑗 =
𝛼𝑗
𝛼𝑗+𝛽𝑗 ). To predict whether
a piece of news is fake or not, the linear transformation of 𝑝𝑗 is computed:
𝑞𝑗 = 2𝑝𝑗 − 1 = 𝛼𝑗−𝛽𝑗𝛼𝑗+𝛽𝑗 , where a positive value indicates true news; otherwise it’s
fake news.
The model is trained in a semi-supervised manner. Let the training set consists
of two subsets 𝑉𝐹 , 𝑉𝑇 ⊆ 𝑉 for labeled fake and true news, and 𝛷𝑖 = {𝑢𝑖|(𝑢𝑖, 𝑣𝑗) ∈
𝐿} and 𝛷𝑗 = {𝑣𝑗 |(𝑢𝑖, 𝑣𝑗) ∈ 𝐿}. The labels are set as 𝑞𝑗 = −1 for all 𝑣𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝐹 , and
𝑞𝑗 = 1 for all 𝑣𝑗 ∈ 𝐼𝑇 , and q𝑞𝑗 = 0 for unlabeled news pieces. The parameter
optimization of user 𝑢𝑖 is performed iteratively by following updating functions:
𝛼𝑖 =𝛥𝛼 +
∑︁
𝑞𝑖>0,𝑖∈𝛷𝑖
𝑞𝑖
𝛽𝑖 =𝛥𝛽 −
∑︁
𝑞𝑖<0,𝑖∈𝛷𝑖
𝑞𝑖
𝑞𝑖 =(𝛼𝑖 − 𝛽𝑖)/(𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖)
(13)
where 𝛥𝛼 and 𝛥𝛽 are the prior base constants indicating the degree the user
believing the fake or true news. Similarly, the parameter of news 𝑣𝑗 is updated
as,
𝛼𝑗 =𝛥′𝛼 +
∑︁
𝑞𝑗>0,𝑗∈𝛷𝑗
𝑞𝑗
𝛽𝑗 =𝛥′𝛽 −
∑︁
𝑞𝑗<0,𝑗∈𝛷𝑗
𝑞𝑗
𝑞𝑗 =(𝛼𝑗 − 𝛽𝑗)/(𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗)
(14)
where 𝛥′𝛼 and 𝛥′𝛽 are the prior constants indicating the ratio of fake or true
news. In this way, the stance (like) information are aggregated to optimize the
parameters, which can be used to predict the news veracity using 𝑞𝑗 [29].
We can infer the implicit stance values from social media posts, which usually
requires a labeled stance dataset to train a supervised model. The inferred stance
scores then serve as the input to perform fake news classification. Fake news pieces
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are more likely to receive controversial stances. Existing work mainly focuses on
extracting hand-crafted linguistic features and using deep neural networks to
obtain latent features, while few papers focus on network perspective.
5 Fake News Mitigation
Fake news mitigation aims to reduce the negative effects brought by fake news.
From a network analysis perspective, the goal is to minimize the scope of fake
news spreading on social media. To achieve this, key spreaders of fake news need
to be discovered such as provenances and persuaders . In addition, estimating
the potential population affected by a fake news is useful for decision-makers
to mitigate otherwise influential fake news. Moreover, choosing specific users
to block the cascade of fake news, and even to start mitigation campaigns to
immunize users are required to minimize the influence of fake news.
5.1 User Identification
Identifying key users on social media is important to mitigate the effect of
fake news. For example, the provenances of fake news indicates the sources or
originators. Provenances can help answer questions such as whether the piece of
news has been modified during its propagation, and how an “owner” of the piece
of information is connected to the transmission of the statement. In addition, it’s
necessary to identify influential persuaders to limit the spread scope of fake news
by blocking the information flow from them to their followers on social media.
Identifying Provenances Given the diffusion network 𝐺𝐷, 𝑃 ⊆ 𝑈 , and a
positive integer constant, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑍+, we identify the sources, 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑈 , such that
|𝑆| ≤ 𝑘, and 𝑈(𝑆, 𝑃 ) is maximized. Function 𝑈(𝑆, 𝑃 ) estimates the utility of
information propagation starting from 𝑆 and ending at 𝑃 . The Information
Provenance (IP) problem estimates sources 𝑆.
𝑆 = argmax
𝑆∈𝑈,|𝑆|≤𝑘
𝑈(𝑆, 𝑃 ), (15)
𝐾 ∈ 𝑍+ is a positive integer because information in social media could originate
from multiple sources. The solution to the above problem is based on the possible
paths of information propagation using provenance seeking nodes, referred to
as provenance paths. The provenance paths of information are usually unknown.
In fact, the provenance paths for fake news dissemination in social media still
remains an open problem. Here, we introduce how previous work define and
approach this problem, which has potential to be applied and adapted to fake
news research. The provenance paths objective can be formulated as,
?^?𝑘 = argmax
𝑘∈𝑍+
𝑈(𝐺𝑘), (16)
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where 𝑈(𝐺𝑘) estimates the utility of the provenance paths 𝐺𝑘, for given 𝑃 nodes.
The utility function depends on the underlying information propagation model.
For example, as the independent cascade model, 𝑈(𝐺𝑘) is estimated as the
product of all propagation probabilities, i.e., 𝑈(𝐺𝑘) =
∏︀
(𝑢→𝑣)∈𝐺𝑘 𝑝(𝑢→ 𝑣). For
a given graph 𝐺, there are exponentially many subgraphs having 𝑘-most roots
and covering all the nodes in 𝑃 . The problem aims to extract a subgraph (?^?𝑘)
with the maximum utility. This problem is NP-complete, and challenges arise
because: 1) only a few nodes (𝑃 ) are given, and 2) 𝐺𝐷 is usually in large-scale.
To solve this problem, existing work considers the node properties, such as
node centralities, to capture the potential provenance nodes. Some observations
are commonly revealed in information diffusion process: (1) Degree propensity
suggests that the higher degree centrality nodes in a network are more likely to
be transmitters than the randomly selected nodes, and (2) Closeness propensity
reveals that the higher degree nodes closer to the nodes in 𝑃 are more likely
to be transmitters than the randomly selected higher degree nodes. Based on
the Degree Propensity and Closeness Propensity hypotheses, the nodes with
higher degree centralities that are closer to the P-nodes are more likely to be
transmitters. Hence, as shown in [3], the method can estimate top 𝑚 transmitters,
from the given set of 𝑃 nodes. Let M be a set of these top 𝑚 transmitters, then
the provenance paths can be recovered using an approximate algorithm as in [3].
The basic idea and procedure is as follows in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Finding Provenance Paths
Require: 𝐺𝐷, 𝑃 , Transmitters 𝑀 , 𝑘
Ensure: 𝐺𝑘, S
1: 𝐺𝑘 ← ∪𝑐∈𝑀dst(𝐺𝐷, 𝑐, 𝑃 ) ◁ Combining all the shortest paths from a node 𝑐 to each
of the 𝑃 nodes
2: 𝑆 ← find_sources(𝐺𝑘) ◁ Initializing sources from the roots of 𝐺𝑘
3: while |𝑆| ≥ 𝑘 do
4: 𝑐← MinComAnc(𝐺𝐷, 𝑆) ◁ Finding a common node with average distance from
node c to any pair of nodes (𝑢, 𝑣) ∈ 𝑆 is the minimum
5: 𝐺𝑘 ← 𝐺𝑘 ∪ dst(𝐺𝐷, 𝑐, 𝑆)
6: 𝑆 ← find_sources(𝐺𝑘)
7: if |𝑆| not decreasing then
8: 𝑆 ← GreedSel(𝐺𝐷, 𝑆, 𝑃, 𝑘) ◁ Greedily selecting k nodes in 𝑆 such that each
𝑠 ∈ 𝑆 can reach the maximum number of 𝑃 nods
9: end if
10: end while
Identifying Persuaders Leadership-theory suggests that opinion leaders likely
to influence their followers’ actions and beliefs [10]. Given this, a leadership-
based approach should be able to identify 𝐾-leaders such that they perform
actions on the maximum number of posts. Then, given the diffusion network
𝐺𝐷, the first step is to construct a bipartite network 𝐺′𝐷 = (𝑈 ∪ 𝑆,𝐸), with
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𝑈 being the set of users and 𝑆 being the posts they write. The problem of
identifying K leaders is similar to the minimum dominating set problem, which
is NP-complete even for bipartite graphs. Therefore, the cost of selecting user
𝑢𝑖 as a leader is equivalent to the total number of posts she acted on, i.e,
𝑐({𝑢𝑖}) = 1𝑒(𝑢𝑖,𝑠𝑗)∈𝐸 where 1 is the indicator function. Similarly, the cost of
selecting set 𝑈 ′ as leaders can be computed as 𝑐(𝑈 ′) =
∑︀
𝑢𝑖∈𝑈 ′ 1𝑒(𝑢𝑖,𝑠𝑗)∈𝐸 . The
cost function 𝑐 : P(𝑈 ′) → R, where P(𝑈 ′) denotes the power set of users 𝑈 ′,
which satisfies the following properties: (1) non-negative: for every 𝑈 ′ ⊆ 𝑈 ,
𝑐(𝑈 ′) ≥ 0; (2) non-decreasing: for every 𝑈 ′1, 𝑈 ′2 ⊆ 𝑈 with 𝑈 ′1 ⊆ 𝑈 ′2, 𝑐(𝑈 ′1) ≤ 𝑐(𝑈 ′2);
and (3) sub-modular: for every 𝑈 ′1, 𝑈 ′2 ⊆ 𝑈 with 𝑈 ′1 ⊆ 𝑈 ′2 and every 𝑢 ∈ 𝑈 ∖ 𝑈 ′1,
𝑐(𝑈 ′1∪{𝑢})−𝑐({𝑢}) ≥ 𝑐(𝑈 ′2∪{𝑢})−𝑐({𝑈 ′2}). Based on the properties, the problem
of finding 𝐾-leaders is tantamount to the maximization of a non-negative, non-
decreasing, sub-modular function with cardinality constraint. A hill-climbing
algorithm can solve this problem with a provable constant approximation.
5.2 Network Size Estimation
The fake news diffusion process has different stages in terms of people’s attention
and reactions over time, resulting in a unique life cycle different from that of
in-depth news [5]. The impact of fake news on social media can be estimated as
the number of users that are potentially affected by the news piece, an amount
we want to assess and then minimize. We can adapt the network scale-up based
method [4] for estimating the size of uncountable populations to estimate the
size of the population affected by fake news on the provenance paths discussed
previously. Specifically, we can assume that two different approaches 𝛺𝐴 and 𝛺𝐵
are utilized to find provenance paths, and the resultant nodes that in the paths
are the receivers of the fake news, i.e., 𝑅𝐴 and 𝑅𝐵. If we assume that the two
methods produce independent results, then the quantity |𝑅𝐴 ∩𝑅𝐴|/|𝑅𝐴| is an
estimate of the fraction of the recipients covered by method 𝐴. Then the scale-up
based method suggests that the total number of recipient 𝑁 can be estimated as,
𝑁 = 𝑅𝐴 * |𝑅𝐵 ||𝑅𝐴 ∩𝑅𝐵 | (17)
However, the two methods 𝛺𝐴 and 𝛺𝐵 may not produce independent results as
social media data is intrinsically linked. For example, 𝛺𝐴 and 𝛺𝐵 can be the
results from different platforms (e.g., Facebook and Twitter), thus |𝑅𝐴 ∩ 𝑅𝐵 |
can be better estimated as 𝑅𝑎 and 𝑅𝑏 on two platforms that are likely more
independent than 𝑅𝐴 and 𝑅𝐵 on the same platform. Various methods of linking
user identities [28] can be applied to identify the overlaps of 𝑅𝐴 and 𝑅𝐵 .
5.3 Network Intervention
The goal of network intervention is to develop strategies to control the widespread
dissemination of fake news before it goes viral. Network intervention mainly
consists of two perspectives as follows:
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Influence Minimization Limiting the spread of fake news can be seen as
analogous to inoculation in the face of an epidemic. Models of epidemics generally
assume that a global parameter describes the probability that a user is infected
by a neighbor. This assumption is violated in real-world situations of information
exchange where users have varying degrees of willingness to accept information
from their neighbors. Thus, the Independent Cascade Model (ICM) [22] is
proposed to alleviate this problem by assuming each edge has its specific activation
probability. ICM is denoted as a sender-centric model. Specifically, the node that
becomes active at time 𝑖 has, in the next time step 𝑖+1, one chance of activating
each of its neighbors. Let 𝑢 be an active node at time 𝑡. Then, for any neighbor
𝑢′, there is a probability 𝑝𝑢,𝑢′ that node 𝑢′ gets activated at 𝑖+ 1. Our goal is
to stop the information cascade and thus to limit the influence of fake news.
This can be treated as an influence minimization problem: Given the diffusion
network 𝐺𝐷 with the initial infected user set 𝑈 ′ ⊆ 𝑈 , the goal is to minimize the
number of final infected users by blocking 𝑘 users of the set 𝐷 ⊆ 𝑈 such that
the following function is optimized,
𝐷* = argmin 𝜎(𝑆|𝑈 ∖ 𝑈 ′) (18)
where 𝜎(𝑆|𝑈 ∖ 𝑈 ′) denotes the influence of set 𝑈 ′ when nodes in the set 𝐷 are
blocked. The intuitive criteria to obtain the “blocking user” set 𝐷 include: i)
limiting the number of out-links of the sender node and potentially reducing
the chance of activating others; ii) limiting the number of in-links of receiver
nodes and therefore reducing their chance of being activated by others; and iii)
decreasing the activation probability of a node (𝑝𝑢𝑢′) and therefore reducing the
chance of activating others.
Mitigation Campaign Limiting the impact of fake news is not only to mini-
mize the spread of fake news but also maximize the spread of true news. The
campaign to mitigate fake news and to maximize true news forms during the
information diffusion process. The network activities of fake news and real news
can be represented as Multivariate Hawks Processes (MHP) with self and mutual
excitations, where the control incentivizes more spontaneous mitigation events [8].
The influence of fake and real news is quantified using event exposure counts,
represented by the number of times users are exposed to the news. The goal is
to optimize the activity policy of a set of campaigner users to mitigate a fake
news process stemming from another set of users. The whole idea is to optimize
the performance of real news propagation (through the campaigner users) in
diffusion network, ensuring that people who are exposed to fake news are also
exposed to real news, so that they are less likely to be convinced by fake news.
Specifically, we define fake news MDP as 𝐹 (𝑡) = (𝐹1(𝑡), 𝐹2(𝑡), ..., 𝐹𝑚(𝑡)), where
𝐹𝑖(𝑡) is the number of times that user 𝑢𝑖 shares a pieces of news from fake news
campaign up to time 𝑡; similarly 𝑀(𝑡) for mitigation campaign. The objective is
to maximize the common exposure of fake and real news, with a reward function
𝑅 in the current stage 𝑡,
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𝑅(𝑥𝑘, 𝑢𝑘) = 1
𝑚
ℱ 𝑡(𝜏𝑡+1;𝑥𝑡, 𝑢𝑡)ℳ𝑡(𝜏𝑡+1;𝑥𝑡, 𝑢𝑡) (19)
where ℳ(·) (ℱ(·)) is the exposure process for news in mitigation (fake) cam-
paign. The friendship network 𝐺𝐹 can be represented by a user-user adjacency
matrix 𝐴 ∈ {0, 1}𝑚×𝑚, we have ℱ 𝑡 = 𝐴𝐹 (𝑡) and ℳ𝑡 = 𝐴𝑀(𝑡). 𝑥𝑡 is the state
representation, and 𝑢𝑡 is the intensity value, and 𝜏𝑡+1 is the time of next stage.
Fig.6. The Influence limitation strategies: user blocking and mitigation campaign.
As shown in Figure 6, the “user blocking” strategy assumes that each user
can only be in one state (i.e., normal, infected, and blocked), and the state will
not change. For example, since user 𝑢2 and 𝑢4 are blocked, 𝑢5 will not be infected.
As tested in [8], the “mitigation campaign” strategy assumes people exposed
more to fake news should also be exposed more to true news, so they are less
likely to believe completely in fake news. For example, if user 𝑢5 receives both
information from the fake campaign through user 𝑢4 and from the mitigation
campaign through 𝑢2, he/she is less likely to believe the fake campaign in the
case of a user who does not receive the mitigation campaign.
6 Summary
This chapter presents some recent trends in studying fake news on social media
via network analysis. During fake news dissemination, different entities are
involved that can be categorized into content, social and temporal dimensions.
In addition, the inherent network properties motivate and strengthen the needs
to perform network analysis to study fake news. The dimensions of fake news
dissemination reveal mutual relations and dependencies that can form different
types of networks. Based on these networks, we introduce some representative
methods to demonstrate how to perform fake news detection and mitigation.
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